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Abstract
What has been the quantitative eﬀect on productivity growth of information and commu-
nication technology (ICT) in Europe after 1995? Based on a multi-country sectoral panel data
set, we provide econometric evidence of positive and significant productivity eﬀects of ICT in
Europe, mainly due to advances in total factor productivity. In contrast to the US, this impact
of ICT has happened against a negative macro economic shock not related to ICT. Our main
result is in contrast to the established consensus in the growth accounting literature that there
has been no acceleration of productivity growth in Europe, mainly due to the performance of
ICT-using sectors. One important advantage of using econometric methods is that we can dis-
tinguish between growth eﬀects from ICT and macro economic shocks; a feature that growth
accounting methods cannot handle.
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1 Introduction
This paper provides new econometric evidence on the relationship between information and commu-
nication technology (ICT) and productivity growth in Europe. We nd that ICT-intensive indus-
tries went through a far less dramatic reduction in productivity growth after 1995 than industries
which did not use ICT intensively in production. In e¤ect, the overall slow-down in productivity
growth that happened in Europe after 1995, would have been even more dramatic in the absence of
any positive impact of ICT. This result is contrary to the general consensus reached in the growth
accounting literature as recently summarized by Draca, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2006): "There
has been no acceleration of productivity growth in the EU, mainly due to the performance of the
ICT using sectors."1 Whereas our econometric ndings conrm the rst part of this statement, we
nd signicant e¤ects of ICT, including a positive e¤ect on productivity growth among ICT users.
Two important di¤erences in terms of productivity developments between Europe and the
United States stand out in the literature. First, a productivity gap between Europe and the United
States developed over the second half of the 1990s because the aggregate productivity levels of the
two regions diverged. For example, Van Ark, OMahony, and Timmer (2008) nd that the US
productivity growth rate increased from 1.5 per cent before 1995 to 3 per cent after 1995, whereas
the productivity growth rate in Europe declined from 2.4 per cent to 1.5 per cent.
Second, OMahony and Van Ark (2003) found that although European ICT-producing sectors
experienced a productivity acceleration similar to that of US ICT-producers, ICT-using sectors
failed to achieve a similar development in Europe. However, the fact that ICT-using industries
in Europe showed stagnant productivity does not in itself preclude a positive di¤erential impact
of ICT. In order to identify the impact of ICT use, the performance of ICT users will have to be
compared to the aggregate scenario of declining productivity growth in Europe during the 1990s.
Our main hypothesis is based on these observations. We test if ICT had a positive di¤erential
impact on productivity growth in the sense that ICTintensive industries had signicantly higher
productivity growth rates than non-ICT-intensive industries after 1995. To properly address this
question it is crucial to distinguish aggregate macro e¤ects from sectoral e¤ects generated by dif-
ferences in the use of ICT. Therefore, we apply econometric methods that control separately for
macro e¤ects, sector-specic xed e¤ects, and the e¤ects from ICT-use.
1This consensus has also found its way to the Economist in the feature "Europe: Use IT or lose it" of May 17,
2007, a feature based on Van Ark et al (2007).
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The applied data source is the industry data from the EUKLEMS database.2 This dataset
comprises a large set of internationally comparable data on productivity developments at a disag-
gregated sectoral level. The database also contains detailed data on capital investments, including
ICT related capital expenditures. We exploit the panel structure of the country and industry data
to control for unobserved industry-specic and country-specic xed e¤ects as well as time e¤ects.
This allows us to identify the productivity e¤ects of ICT within industries and, therefore, separately
from productivity e¤ects generated by changes in the business structure.
Our use of econometric methods has some advantages over the growth accounting framework
usually employed in the literature on productivity growth determinants.3 The econometric methods
quantify the impact of ICT by exploiting the variation in industry-level data. Moreover, they allow
statistical tests of signicance of the economic impact of ICT. In contrast, the growth-accounting
method basically assumes the result since factor shares are used as measures for output elasticities.
Moreover, the growth accounting methods decompose labor productivity growth into contri-
butions from labor composition, capital deepening, and multifactor productivity. The latter com-
ponent is a residual measure with multiple interpretations; it can be a measure of technological
progress but could also pick up widespread macroeconomic shocks. In other words, it is not possible
to distinguish between e¤ects on productivity from new technology, e.g., ICT, and macro economic
e¤ects, e.g., e¤ects of labor market reforms, changes in competition, regulation, etc.
Our main ndings are that the decline in labor productivity growth after 1995 is a general phe-
nomenon across European industries but sectoral productivity growth rates decreased the most in
non-ICT-intensive industries. More specically, the average decline in sectoral growth rates of non
ICT-intensive industries was around 1 percentage point for labor productivity growth after 1995.
This was partly countervailed by a positive e¤ect of around 0.8 percentage points in industries
that were ICT-intensive pre-1995. Our results weaken when ICT-producers are excluded although
an economically signicant di¤erential e¤ect of 0.5 percentage points remains for ICT-users versus
remaining sectors. The result does not depend critically on the developments in nancial interme-
diation (FIRE) industries nor the exact timing of the break.
In addition to providing results on labor productivity in a comparable multi-country setting, a
main contribution of our paper is to extend the analysis to total factor productivity (TFP) growth.
The extension is crucial in order to distinguish genuine e¤ects of technological progress due to ICT
2See www.euklems.net or Van Ark et al. (2008).
3See below in Section 2 for a summary of this literature
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from the capital-deepening e¤ects of increasing the amounts of ICT capital used in production in
di¤erent sectors.
Our results show that the average growth rate of total factor productivity (TFP) fell by 0.6-
0.7 percentage points after 1995 in non ICT-intensive sectors. In ICT intensive industries, there
was a countervailing positive growth e¤ect of 0.6 percentage points. The result does not depend
critically on developments in ICT-producing industries, FIRE industries, nor the exact timing of the
break. Hence, we nd evidence that that higher ICT intensity has contributed positively to TFP
productivity growth in Europe, including an economically sizable and statistically signicant TFP
gain in intensively ICT-using industries. Moreover, a comparison of TFP and labor productivity
impacts of ICT shows that the impact of ICT in Europe is predominantly due to gains in TFP
rather than capital deepening.
The basic set-up of our analysis is closely related to Stiroh (2002). He analyzed the relationship
between ICT intensity and labor productivity growth across industries for the United States. A
comparison with Stirohs results will thus enable us to quantitatively assess whether the US is ahead
of Europe in terms of productive applications of ICT. This turns out to be the case since Stiroh
found a larger di¤erences in terms of post-1995 labor productivity growth between ICT-intensive
and non-ICT-intensive industries. His point estimate suggests almost 2 percentage points higher
growth rate of labor productivity compared to other industries for the US economy. The overall
conclusion is that there has been signicant e¤ects of ICT in European economies but that the
e¤ects have been around half of the ICT e¤ects experienced in the United States when looking at
labor productivity growth.
The paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 is a brief review of the literature on ICT and
productivity growth at the sectoral level. Section 3 documents the basic descriptive facts about
the aggregate growth scenario, the development of certain sectors, and the timing of a break in
productivity in Europe during the 1990s. Section 4 provides a detailed account of the EUKLEMS
data on which our analysis is based while section 5 summarizes our econometric approach. Our
empirical results are reported in Section 6, whereas Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
The literature on the possible impact of ICT on productivity growth took o¤ from the so-called
Solow paradox, the observation by Solow (1987) that although enormous technological progress in
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ICT production had been realized and gone along with strong investments in ICT, hardly any e¤ect
on economic growth could be observed. Subsequent studies on ICT and productivity growth in the
macro literature have mostly been performed for the United States using the growth-accounting
framework. For an introduction to the growth accounting methodology, see Jorgenson et al (1987).
The studies nd that productivity growth has accelerated after 1995 and a consensus has been
established that this acceleration is linked to ICT.4 This was stated by Dale Jorgenson in his
presidential address to the American Economic Association meeting, see Jorgenson (2001):
"The resurgence of the American economy since 1995 has outrun all but the most
optimistic expectations. Economic forecasting models have been seriously o¤ track
and growth projections have been revised to reect a more sanguine outlook only re-
cently......Productivity growth in IT- producing industries has gradually risen in impor-
tance and a productivity revival is now under way in the rest of the economy. Despite
di¤erences in methodology and data sources, a consensus is building that the remarkable
behavior of IT prices provides the key to the surge in economic growth."
An implication of these ndings is that the Solow Paradox no longer applies. The paradox was
simply a consequence of ICT constituting a small part of the capital stock.
The growth-accounting method decomposes labor productivity growth into growth in labor
input, growth contributions by capital deepening, and growth in TFP. In order to assess the mag-
nitude of the direct e¤ects of ICT on growth, two additional steps are taken. First, to measure
the contribution from the use of ICT capital, the growth in capital input is decomposed into two
elements, one related to ICT capital and one related to other capital goods. Second, to single out
the contribution from technological progress in the production of ICT capital, the private sector is
decomposed into ICT-producing industries and ICT-using industries. The technological progress
in the production of ICT is then measured by the TFP growth in the former industries. Using this
method, Oliner and Sichel (2000) nd that the growth rate in labor productivity increased by 1.04
percentage points from 1991-95 to 1996-99 for the US. Of this increase 43 per cent can be attributed
to the accumulation of ICT capital in all industries, whereas 36 per cent can be attributed to TFP
growth in ICT-producing sectors. The method also provides a measure of TFP growth, however,
this measure cannot be linked directly to ICT, though it may reect that ICT-using sectors have
higher productivity partly as a result of higher ICT use.
4See for example, Oliner and Sichel (2000), Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2008), and Whelan (2002).
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Using industry data, Stiroh (2002) produces econometric evidence that there was signicant
productivity growth in the ICT-using sectors, even after controlling for macro economic shocks.
The analysis is performed for US industries for the periods 1987-95 and 1995-2000.5 The main
ndings are that the acceleration in productivity is a broad phenomenon across US industries 
not only in ICT-producing sectors  but that growth rates increased the most in ICT-intensive
industries. More specically, ICT-intensive industries experienced a productivity acceleration about
2 percentage points greater than other industries. The results are developed for labor productivity
growth. It remains unclear whether e¤ects from ICT are generated through capital deepening or
TFP.6
Some growth-accounting studies have also appeared for European economies. Contrary to the
United States, European productivity growth did not accelerate after 1995; instead aggregate labor
productivity growth declined. In other words, the productivity gap betwen Europe and the United
States widened, see Van Ark et al (2008).
OMahony and Van Ark (2003) perform a comparative study between the United States and
a small number of European countries (EU-4). The authors nd that European ICT-producing
sectors had similar productivity acceleration as in the United States. Moreover, the authors nd
that productivity growth in the EU remained relatively stable across time in intensively ICT-using
sectors, in contrast to a very large acceleration in the US. According to the authors, this is a clear
indication that the US is ahead of Europe in terms of productive application of ICT outside the
ICT producing sector itself. Also based on the growth accounting framework, Timmer and Van
Ark (2005) nd that the di¤erence in ICT-capital deepening and from the contribution from TFP
growth in ICT-goods production explain the major gap in growth rates between Europe and the
United States after 1995. These conclusions are followed up in Van Ark et al (2008) who conclude
that "the European productivity slowdown is attributable to the slower emergence of the knowledge
economy in Europe compared to the United States".7
5OMahony and Vecchi (2005) perform an econometric comparison of the United Kingdom and the US. Estimates
suggest a strong impact in the United States, whereas the results are less conclusive for the United Kingdom.
6Jorgenson et al (2008) argue that US productivity growth after 1995 and up to 2000 was driven by productivity
growth in ICT producing sectors and ICT-capital-deepening e¤ects. After 2000 productivity growth is driven by TFP
growth in ICT-using industries.
7Van Ark et al (2008) evaluate the e¤ect of structural changes on productivity growth. They nd that reallocation
of labor between industries has contributed negatively to labor productivity growth after 1995 in Europe. This can,
however, not explain the low European growth rates, since the negative reallocation e¤ect is numerically larger for
the United States.
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3 European productivity developments in the 1990s
Europe enjoyed a much less favourable productivity trend than the US after 1995. Table 1 details
the labor productivity developments in eight European countries using the US for comparison. The
table contains the unweighted average of labor productivity growth rates over industries for the pre-
and post-1995 periods for the nonfarm business sector, and the nonfarm business sector excluding
ICT producers or FIRE industries, respectively. The included European economies are Austria,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.
[Table 1 about here]
It is evident that the average industry growth rates either decreased or increased only slightly
in Europe post-1995 with the only exception of Austria that experienced an increasing growth rate
of 0.7 percentage points. When excluding ICT production it is found that the average growth
rates fell in all European economies except in Austria that experienced an increase of around half
a percentage point. In contrast to the European economies, the average industry growth rate in
the United States more than doubled post-1995.
While the rate of productivity growth was generally very modest in Europe compared to the US,
there was also some degree of dispersion in productivity growth rates across European countries. In
order to be able to measure any di¤erential productivity impact in relatively ICT-intensive sectors,
we will have to take into account that such di¤erences happened against a much weaker general
productivity trend than in the US.
When studying growth rates across subperiods, it is of course important to determine the break
year. In the growth accounting literature the applied break year is 1995, see for example Jorgenson
et al (2008). A break in productivity trends during 1995 is supported econometrically by Hansen
(2001) and Stiroh (2002) who analyze quarterly data for the US business sector over the period
from 1974 to 2001. This tradition has been passed on as the standard point of reference used in
analyzing the aggregate European experience, e.g., in Van Ark, OMahony, and Timmer (2008).
Although the dividing line of 1995 has been accepted for Europe as well, this tradition is not
based on any statistical tests; according to our knowledge, no such statistical test of break year
for European productivity exists. Empirically, the date of any break is less easily determined for
individual European countries than for the US because the available data are annual. By having a
set of comparable panel data, we can pool the data across countries. The cost that we have to cover
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when pooling is an assumption that the break happens simultaneously across all countries. The
test presented in Figure 1 applies the Sup F test of Andrews (1993) to a pooled data set containing
the nonfarm business sector industries across eight European countries.8
[Figure 1 about here]
Details on the applied model is presented in Section 5 below. The dotted curve shows the average
for all eight countries of Sup F tests calculated for each potential break year. We also calculate the
test excluding data for Austria (the dashed line). This country turns out to be non-poolable with
the remaining countries, see Section 6 below.
Figure 1 shows that any trend break in productivity should be found during the second half of
the 1990s. The test is not quite conclusive as to the exact timing of the break. When including all
countries, the maximum test statistic is achieved in 1998. Also 1995 and 1999 are candidate break
years. When excluding Austria from the test 1995 emerges as the main candidate for the break
year. In any case, there is little evidence of a break year prior to 1995.
Overall, by pooling the evidence across countries, we nd that the econometric evidence on
the timing of the break is consistent with the ICT-induced break in the US during 1995 that was
established by Stiroh (2002). In conclusion, we will follow existing literature in allowing for a break
in productivity in 1995. We present further evidence on the robustness of our results as to the
timing of the break in Section 6.
4 Data and Variables
The applied data source is the EUKLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts.9 This database
include data on gross output, value added, ICT capital, other capital, hours worked, employment,
and intermediate inputs at the industry level, implying that analyses of the relationship between
productivity growth and ICT can be carried out for both labor productivity and total factor pro-
ductivity. The database comprises data for the period 1970 to 2004. In the following we discuss
key variables used in the empirical analysis below.





We apply two measures of productivity growth. The rst measure is based on labor productivity
that is simply dened as output divided by labor input, whereas total factor productivity relates
output to a composite of primary factor inputs and intermediate inputs.
The applied measure of output is sectoral gross output. This measure is superior to sectoral
value added because an output measure based on a real value-added function is justied only when
the production function of gross output is separable in real value-added and intermediate inputs.
Jorgenson, Fraumani, and Galop (1987) nd that separability is heavily rejected.
We follow the standard in the literature and measure labor productivity as output in relation
to the total hours worked. When estimating TFP we measure factor inputs as labor service where
labor types with high relative wages weight more than labor types with low relative wages in a
sectoral measure of labor input. Capital service is used as the measure of capital input. As for
labor service, capital service is a measure where capital stocks of di¤erent asset types are weighted
by relative compensations; in this case relative user costs. Finally, intermediate input origin from
supply and use tables.
4.2 ICT intensity
The main measure of ICT-intensity is dened as ICT-capital service out of total capital service.
Moreover, we apply two alternative measures of ICT-intensity; ICT-capital service per worked hour
and ICT-capital service in relation to gross output. These denitions follows Stiroh (2002).
The main analysis is based on dummy variables dened using the main measure of ICT-intensity.
If the ICT-intensity for an industry exceeds the country median value over industries, the dummy
equals 1, whereas it equals 0 otherwise. In the robustness analysis, the empirical results are checked
by using dummy variables based on two alternative measures of ICT-intensity. The regression
analyses are also performed using the continuous measure of ICT intensity.
4.3 Countries and Industry Coverage
Data are provided for 31 industries in the EUKLEMS database. Of these we exclude agriculture,
hunting, forestry and shing as well as mining and quarrying. Moreover, we exclude 4 industries
within non-market services and the personal service sector private households with employed per-
sons. We are left with 24 industries within the nonfarm business sector on which the analysis is
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based.10
Throughout the analysis we distinguish between ICT-producing and -using industries. Stiroh
(2002) found that although productivity growth in the US increased signicantly in all ICT intensive
industries, the e¤ects were found to be stronger among ICT producers. We follow Van Ark et al.
(2007) and dene ICT producers as the ICT-producing manufacturing and service sectors.11
For the purpose of the present analysis, we use data for 8 European countries. These are
Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and United Kingdom.12
5 Econometric Approach
We specify a di¤erence-in-di¤erence regression in terms of the log growth rate of labor productivity,
 lnAijt =  ln (Yijt=Eijt) measured in percentage terms. Here Yijt denotes real gross output of
industry i in country j in year t and likewise for the number of hours worked, Eijt.
 lnAijt = aij + 0j lnAijt 1 + 1jdt + 2jitij95 + 3jdt  itij95 + "ijt (1)
where "ijt is an error term and
dt = 1 for t  1995 and d = 0 otherwise.
ICT-intensity in the break year 1995 in industry j of country i is denoted itij95. We will consider
two di¤erent specications of this term: A binary term that equals one if the ICT intensity of a
particular industry is above the median (and zero otherwise) and a continuous specication that
simply includes the intensity variable itself. Using a binary classication based on the median
provides robustness to outlying measurements.
We exploit the fact that we have a panel of consistent data across a number of European
countries to approach the estimation of (1) at several di¤erent levels of generality. First, as a
starting point to check the actual poolability of the data across countries, we consider country-by-
country analyses that allow full exibility in terms of all parameters, including the  slopes. Second,
when pooling the data across countries we can allow for di¤erent xed e¤ects across countries
10The entering industries are 15t16, 17t19, 20, 21t22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27t28, 29, 30t33, 34t35, 36t37, E, F, H, 50,
51, 52, 60t63, 64, J ,71t74, and O.
11The sectors denoted 30t33 and 64 in the EUKLEMS database.
12Belgium and Spain have been excluded from the analysis because the break-down ICT-data is not detailed enough.
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and/or industries. Four cases are distinguished in terms the intercept aij : A fully pooled case of a
common intercept (aij = ); a case of country-specic intercepts (aij = j) that do not vary across
industries; a case of industry-specic intercepts (aij = i) that do not vary across countries; and
nally, a general set of xed e¤ects that may vary both across countries and industries.
The regression (1) extends Stirohs (2002) approach by including a term in lagged productivity
growth,  lnAijt 1. We nd ample evidence of the general signicance of this extension. For
consistent estimation of the dynamic panel data model we employ the generalized methods of
moments approach of Arellano and Bond (1991).
A second main extension compared to Stiroh (2002) is the analysis of total factor productivity.
For this we specify a di¤-in-di¤ regression in terms of the growth rate of real output:
 lnYijt = bij + 0j lnYijt 1 + 1jdt + 2jitij95 + 3jd itij95 (2)
+4j lnXijt + 5j lnLijt + 6j lnKijt + uijt:
The TFP regression furthermore includes controls for the growth rates of intermediate inputs
( lnXijt), labor ( lnLijt) and capital ( lnKijt), and an error term (uijt).
6 Empirical Results
6.1 Labor productivity
This section reports our results based on (1) for labor productivity growth. For each country
we divide industries into ICT-intensive and non-ICT-intensive industries depending on their ICT
intensities in comparison to the median intensity. In Section 6.3 below, we provide results based
on two alternative measures and a continuous specications of ICT intensity.
[Table 2 about here]
Table 2 contains the individual country results for industries in the nonfarm business sector.
The results reported in Panels A through C di¤er in terms of their treatment of lagged e¤ects
and industry heterogeneity. Panel A reports the results for a simplied di¤erence-in-di¤erence
specication. Panel B adds a term in lagged productivity growth. Panel C additionally extends
the model to include industry xed e¤ects.
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The estimates of the coe¢ cients related to the trend-break term, d, and its interaction term
with ICT-intensity, d  it, are of main interest. They remain fairly stable across specications.
The most general specication (panel C) is preferred because it encompasses the fact that lagged
productivity growth enters very signicantly in some countries and because we can control for any
unobserved time-invariant level di¤erences between industries by including industry xed e¤ects.
The point estimates suggest that seven out of eight countries experienced negative changes in
productivity growth rates in 1995 for non-ICT-intensive industries (the coe¢ cient of d). This is
consistent with a decrease in the aggregate productivity growth rate in Europe after 1995 as found
in the literature. Moreover, since the present analysis is carried out on industry data, it shows
that productivity growth falls on average within industries meaning that the trend break cannot
be (fully) attributed to changing business structure
With respect to the interaction term d  it, six countries have positive point estimates. This
pattern of e¤ects is consistent with a positive impact of ICT after 1995 against an overall negative
change in productivity growth. In this sense, the results suggest that ICT has a¤ected productivity
growth positively after all.
Comparing across European countries, there is an apparent dispersion of point estimates. More-
over, the standard errors of single country estimates are also fairly large and we nd that many
individual country estimates remain insignicant. In order to reduce the uncertainty of point esti-
mates, we pool the data over European countries. The cost of doing this is that we have to assume
that production functions are equal across countries and industries apart from country/industry
xed e¤ects.
Results for Austria are seen to di¤er substantially from the overall pattern of a negative break
and a positive interaction term. We conclude that Austria is too di¤erent to be included in an
overall European panel data set.13 Crucially, we note that our basic conclusion about the timing
of the productivity trend break from Section 2 is left unaltered when Austria is excluded from the
panel. This can be seen by comparison of the dotted and dashed curves in Figure 1. Therefore,
we can still use 1995 as the break year when combining the data into a panel of seven European
countries (EU-7).
The results of the EU-7 panel data regressions are reported in Table 3. Results under the heading
All industries apply to the full set of 24 industries. They di¤er according to the type of xed
13Averaging the interaction term across countries including Austria, the mean e¤ect is 0.56 percentage points,
whereas it becomes 0.80 percentage points when Austria is excluded.
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e¤ects allowed: Pooled excludes xed e¤ects altogether and imposes a common constant term
across countries and industries; FE Country allows intercepts to vary across country (but not
across industry); FE Industryallows intercepts to vary across industry (but not across country);
and FE Generalallows a full set of industry/country specic intercepts. In the latter case, the
coe¢ cient of 1995-ICT intensity (it) is not identied due to its time-invariance.
[Table 3 about here]
There is evidence of an overall negative change of about one percentage point in the rate of labor
productivity growth in non-ICT-intensive industries after 1995; a negative and signicant coe¢ -
cient of d. No signicant di¤erence can be recorded between ICT-intensive and non-ICT-intensive
industries pre-1995; the coe¢ cient of it. The overall negative trend break is to a large extent
counterweighted by the positive and signicant interaction term for the ICT-intensive industries;
the coe¢ cient of d it.
The results are consistent in terms of sign and magnitude both across methods and with the
average results for individual countries in Table 2. In the panel results, we nd that the coe¢ cients
to the break dummy equals -1.10 and .90 to the interaction term, whereas the single country
regressions lead to average coe¢ cients of -1.14 and .80, respectively.14The fact that our panel
estimates remain very close to the average of country-specic results supports the poolability of
the seven countries in the panel.
The remaining results in Table 3 are obtained by excluding certain industries from the panel.15
Excluding the ICT-producing industries (ICT hardware production and telecommunications) we
nd that the interaction term becomes less signicant.16 The nding of a smaller e¤ect when
excluding ICT-producers is consistent with Stirohs results for the US. The marginal loss of sig-
nicance is in keeping with the fact that overall e¤ects for the European case are less signicant.
Looking into the importance of individual ICT-producing industries we nd that the lower level of
signicance is primarily driven by the exclusion of telecommunications. The nal set of results in
Table 3 exclude FIRE industries. There is little change in the coe¢ cient of the interaction term.
14The mean country results (excluding Austria) from Table 1 are .057 for the coe¢ cient of lnA 1, -1.136 for d,
and .801 for d it.
15As results have been found to remain very stable across methods, we report only the most general xed e¤ects
specication.
16The coe¢ cient estimate is borderline insignicant at the ten per cent level.
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In qualitative terms, our main results remain unaltered by excluding FIRE. This is consistent with
Stirohs (2002) ndings for the US.
In Figure 2 we address our initial choice of 1995 as the break year. The gure shows the
estimated coe¢ cient of the interaction term between break-year ICT-intensity, it, and the corre-
sponding break dummy, d, when the potential break year is varied between 1990 and 1999. It also
depicts the approximate 95 per cent condence bands.17 The magnitude of the break in the trend
of labor productivity seems fairly robust to the choice of a di¤erent break year around the middle
of the 1990s.
[Figure 2 about here]
In conclusion, we nd that European industries, which are relatively ICT-intensive pre-1995
outperform remaining industries post-1995 in terms of labor productivity growth. In contrast
to the US, the change happened against a bleak overall European productivity growth scenario.
Our results become weaker when ICT-producers are excluded although an economically signicant
di¤erential e¤ect of 0.5 percentage points remains for ICT-users versus remaining sectors. The
result does not depend critically on the developments in FIRE industries nor the exact timing of
the break.
It is of interest to compare the magnitude of e¤ects to existing results for the United States.
Stiroh (2002) nds an interaction term of two per cent for the United States, implying that the
interaction term for European economies is around half the size. This result is consistent with the
single country regressions in the sense that the e¤ect of ICT in Europe is less noticable that in the
United States, which resulted in imprecise point estimates. Thus, ICT has an positive e¤ect on
productivity growth in Europe, however, it is only half the size of the United States. In this sense,
the di¤erence in the utilization of ICT between the two regions has partially lead the divergence in
productivity levels, but it does not explain the fall in European productivity growth after 1995.
6.2 Total Factor Productivity
We next turn to total factor productivity growth. The importance of this analysis is that it enables
us to study if the relationship between ICT and labor productivity growth is mainly due to capital-
deepening or whether advances in ICT technology also inuence productivity growth. We employ
17Note that this band has a pointwise interpretation only.
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the extended di¤erence-in-di¤erence regression (2) in decomposing the growth rate of real output.
Industries are divided into ICT-intensive and ICT-extensive sectors as above. The basic di¤-in-di¤
regression is augmented by terms to capture the growth rates of input in terms of labor, capital,
and intermediate inputs.
[Table 4 about here]
The importance of the post-1995 productivity slowdown in ICT-extensive sectors reduces to
approximately .6 percentage points as compared to the fall of about one percentage point in the
rate of growth of labor productivity. This suggests that part of the fall in labor productivity around
1995 is due to reduced accumulation of physical capital and intermediate inputs.
As for the case of labor productivity, the ICT-intensive sectors signicantly outperform the
remaining sectors post-1995. The size of the di¤erential TFP gain in ICT-intensive industries (the
coe¢ cient of d  it) is marginally reduced to .6 percentage points from the .8 percentage gain in
labor productivity. Again, this reduction is due to the fact that we take factor accumulation into
account. The negative overall TFP trend break is now completely counterweighted by the positive
interaction term for the ICT-intensive industries.
We address the robustness of our main TFP results in the same directions as above. First, in
Figure 3 we repeat the exercise of changing the break year. A very similar picture emerges although
the overall level of signicance is somewhat reduced compared to the results on labor productivity.
Second, Table 4 shows that the total factor productivity di¤erential does not depend on the presence
of ICT-producing industries nor on developments in the FIRE industries. Signicant e¤ects remain
when excluding either of these sectors.
[Figure 3 about here]
Overall, our TFP extension of the analysis yields three main conclusions. First, there are
signicant TFP gains from ICT in Europe post-1995. Secondly, a comparison of TFP and labor
productivity impacts of ICT shows that most of the impact of ICT in Europe is indeed due to gains
in TFP rather than capital deepening; a result that is di¤erent from the experience in the United
States. Third, we nd economically sizable and statistically signicant TFP gains for intensively
ICT-using industries.
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An interesting observation of the analyses is the growth e¤ect for intensively ICT-using in-
dustries. Under the study of labor productivity growth, a positive but statistically insignicant
di¤erence is found between ICT-intensive and non-ICT-intensive industries, whereas the e¤ect is
positive and statistically signicant under TFP growth. Thus, there is a strong acceleration in TFP
growth in ICT using sectors, whereas it is less pronounced for labor productivity growth. This sug-
gests the European economies, in addition to increasing TFP growth, experienced a reduction in
capital deepening which is especially pronounced for ICT-intensive industries.
6.3 Continuous and alternative ICT intensity measures
In this section we further address the robustness of our main results in dimensions related to
the measurement of ICT intensity. First, instead of the binary classication of ICT intensity in
relation to the median industry intensity, we include the underlying measurements directly in order
to more fully utilize the information in this variable.18 Second, we apply several di¤erent possible
measurements of ICT intensity. Note that the estimates of the coe¢ cient of the interaction term,
ditcont are not directly comparable across denitions or with the main results based on the binary
measure due to di¤erences in the normalizations of these variables.
[Table 5 about here]
Table 5 presents the results for labor productivity and TFP growth. The rst column under the
two growth measures presents the specication of (1) and (2) with industry and country dummies,
i.e., the FE general model. It is seen that the results established in Tables 3 and 4 are robust to
using continuous measures of ICT-intensity. In the remaining columns under each growth measure,
we present results for two alternative denitions of ICT intensity: ICT-capital service per worked
hour and ICT-capital service in relation to gross output.
The results show that our basic conclusion holds: Both labor productivity and TFP experienced
a signicant di¤erential post-1995 gain in ICT intensive industries irrespective of the measure
applied.
18The continuous measures are normalized using country-specic means and standard deviations.
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7 Discussion and Conclusion
We challenge the general consensus that states that there has been no acceleration of productivity
growth in the EU, mainly due to lacking performance of the ICT using sectors during the second
half of the 1990s. Instead we nd signicant productivity gains, especially in TFP, from ICT in
Europe post-1995. This result is established by treating macro economic shocks and productivity
e¤ects from ICT separately in an econometric analysis.
We nd that sectors which are relatively ICT-intensive pre-1995 outperform remaining sectors
post-1995 in terms of labor productivity. Our results become weaker when ICT-producers are
excluded although an economically signicant di¤erential e¤ect of 0.5 percentage points remains
for ICT-users versus remaining sectors. The result does not depend critically on the developments
in FIRE industries nor the exact timing of the break. Our TFP extension of the analysis yields
three main conclusions. First, there are signicant TFP gains from ICT in Europe post-1995.
Secondly, a comparison of TFP and labor productivity impacts of ICT shows that most of the
impact of ICT in Europe is indeed due to gains in TFP rather than capital deepening. Third, we
nd economically sizable and statistically signicant TFP gains for intensive ICT-users.
The ip side of the positive ICT-e¤ects on productivity growth is that the overall European
productivity growth is still bleak. Thus, aggregate as well as industry averages of productivity
growth decreased in Europe after 1995. Our ndings thus clear ICT-using industries from being
the main cause of weak performance because of unexploited productivity gains from ICT. Rather,
the aggregate economy experiences a negative macro economic shock that lead to deceleration of
productivity growth.
There are two broader implications of the analysis presented in the present paper. First, why
are e¤ects on productivity growth in Europe not as large not as large as in the United States?
This question can be divided into the study of why the ICT-capital-deepening e¤ect has been more
extensive in the United States and the study of why US industries have been better to realize
technology advances to productivity growth. The two e¤ects may of course be related.
Second, the underlying reason for the deceleration in European productivity development is still
unresolved. Is the European slowdown generated by labor market reforms getting unskilled and
possible less productive workers back into jobs? According to Bloom et al (2008) this may be part
of the reason, but not all.19 Other potential explanations should also be taken into consideration.
19Bloom et al (2008): "Although some part of the observed European slowdown is due to labor market reforms
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Table 1: Labor productivity growth (per cent per year): EU-8 and US
AUT DNK FIN FRA GER ITA NLD UK US
Panel A: Nonfarm business sector.
1980-1994 3.367 3.052 3.700 3.559 3.120 2.632 2.596 3.531 1.461
1995-2004 4.060 2.062 3.198 3.709 3.492 1.645 2.806 1.683 3.295
Panel B: Nonfarm business sector excluding ICT production.
1980-1994 3.254 2.869 3.433 3.423 3.023 2.664 2.487 3.600 1.160
1995-2004 3.712 1.277 2.382 3.133 2.881 1.155 2.450 1.632 2.778
Panel C: Nonfarm business sector excluding FIRE.
1980-1994 3.419 3.049 3.639 3.700 3.201 2.809 2.616 3.630 1.442
1995-2004 4.024 1.802 3.127 3.659 3.394 1.634 2.828 1.706 3.292
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Table 2: Labor productivity: Individual country results
AUT DNK FIN FRA GER ITA NLD UK
Panel A: No lagged productivity growth rate, no industry xed e¤ects.
d 1.689*** -1.122 -1.921*** -0.141 -0.206 -1.042** -0.086 -2.415***
(0.639) (0.676) (0.610) (0.539) (0.553) (0.454) (0.582) (0.719)
it 0.154 -0.999** -1.100** -0.119 0.573 0.184 0.462 -1.562***
(0.347) (0.393) (0.550) (0.537) (0.522) (0.428) (0.513) (0.488)
d it -1.699** -0.354 2.354*** 0.681 1.474 1.303 0.612 0.734
(0.933) (0.877) (1.045) (1.026) (1.029) (0.930) (1.031) (0.956)
Panel B: Lagged productivity growth rate, no industry xed e¤ects.
 lnA 1 -0.025 -0.114 0.189*** 0.298*** -0.002 0.149** 0.227** 0.270***
(0.069) (0.056) (0.050) (0.061) (0.120) (0.060) (0.073) (0.064)
d 1.127 -1.293 -2.079*** -0.580 -0.642 -1.459*** -0.172 -1.329**
(0.686) (0.829) (0.514) (0.383) (0.593) (0.391) (0.538) (0.597)
it -0.160 -0.693 -0.869 -0.247 0.491 0.038 0.505 -0.886*
(0.449) (0.526) (0.558) (0.412) (0.490) (0.460) (0.670) (0.457)
d it -1.015 -0.712 1.821** 0.610 1.604 1.101 0.326 0.219
(1.039) (1.064) (0.902) (0.699) (1.127) (0.793) (0.894) (0.744)
Panel C: Lagged productivity growth rate, industry xed e¤ects.
 lnA 1 -0.107 -0.151*** 0.063 0.148** -0.086 0.056 0.182** 0.184**
(0.065) (0.055) (0.040) (0.070) (0.109) (0.047) (0.075) (0.048)
d 1.270** -1.327* -2.308*** -0.463 -0.629* -1.492*** -0.130 -1.603***
(0.594) (0.683) (0.484) (0.340) (0.372) (0.3481) (0.481) (0.483)
it        
d it -1.134 -0.691 2.198*** 0.613 1.718* 1.165 0.307 0.294
(0.783) (0.870) (0.676) (0.587) (0.902) (0.745) (0.827) (0.631)
*,**, ***: Signicant at the 10, 5, or 1 percent level, respectively.
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Table 3: Labor productivity: Panel results (EU-7)
All industries W/o ICT prod. W/o FIRE
Pooled FE Country FE Industry FE General FE General FE General
lnA 1 0.150*** 0.144*** 0.094*** 0.054 0.022 0.050**
(0.040) (0.040) (0.034) (0.033) (0.032) (0.034)
d -1.031*** -1.035*** -1.048*** -1.098*** -1.194*** -1.101***
(0.178) (0.181) (0.189) (0.199) (0.194) (0.200)
it -0.286 -0.288 -0.117   
(0.228) (0.223) (0.229)
d it 0.814*** 0.819*** 0.861*** 0.901*** 0.490 0.824**
(0.298) (0.301) (0.318) (0.332) (0.306) (0.349)
*,**, ***: Signicant at the 10, 5, or 1 percent level, respectively.
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Table 4: Total factor productivity: Panel results (EU-7)
All industries W/o ICT prod. W/o FIRE
Pooled FE Country FE Industry FE General FE General FE General
 lnY 1 0.118*** 0.114*** 0.098*** 0.061** 0.035 0.054*
(0.035) (0.034) (0.032) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028)
d -0.653*** -0.644*** -0.677*** -0.623*** -0.643*** -0.622***
(0.139) (0.135) (0.142) (0.145) (0.151) (0.145)
it -0.104 -0.112 -0.172   
(0.160) (0.161) (0.203)
d  it 0.572** 0.582** 0.633** 0.619** 0.481* 0.660**
(0.256) (0.258) (0.262) (0.274) (0.282) (0.287)
 lnX 0.360*** 0.359*** 0.353*** 0.351*** 0.370*** 0.360***
(0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.081) (0.099) (0.086)
 lnL 0.180*** 0.181*** 0.203*** 0.210*** 0.208*** 0.210***
(0.048) (0.049) (0.052) (0.054) (0.064) (0.056)
 lnK 0.026 0.031 0.028 0.051** 0.053** 0.056**
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025)
*,**, ***: Signicant at the 10, 5, or 1 percent level, respectively.
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Table 5: Continuous and alternative measures of ICT intensity: Labor productivity and TFP, panel
results (EU-7)
Labor productivity Total factor productivity
Standard Altern. 1 Altern. 2 Standard Altern. 1 Altern. 2
 lnA 1 0.053 0.047 0.049   
(0.033) (0.032) (0.032)
 lnY 1    0.061** 0.060** 0.061**
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
d -0.648*** -0.649*** -0.649*** -0.314*** -0.316*** -0.317***
(0.160) (0.148) (0.155) (0.113) (0.110) (0.112)
itcont      
d itcont 0.647** 1.018*** 0.829*** 0.288*** 0.402*** 0.338***
(0.224) (0.240) (0.265) (0.171) (0.193) (0.171)
 lnX 0.351*** 0.350*** 0.351***
(0.081) (0.081) (0.081)
 lnL 0.211*** 0.214*** 0.213***
(0.054) (0.055) (0.054)
 lnK 0.050** 0.048** 0.049**
(0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
*,**, ***: Signicant at the 10, 5, or 1 percent level, respectively.
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